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The importance of fault tolerance at the processor archi-
tecture level has been made increasingly important due to
rapid advancements in the design and usage of high per-
formance devices and embedded processors. System level
solutions to the challenge of fault tolerance flag errors and
utilize penalty cycles to recover through the re-execution of
instructions. This motivates the need for a hybrid technique
providing fault detection as well as fault masking, with
minimal penalty cycles for recovery from detected errors.
We propose three architectural schemes to protect the con-
trol logic of microprocessors against Single Event Upsets
(SEUs). High fault coverage with relatively low hardware
overhead is obtained by using both fault detection with re-
covery and fault masking. Control signals are classified as
either static or dynamic, and static signals are further clas-
sified as opcode dependent and instruction dependent. The
strategy for protecting static instruction dependent control
signals utilizes a distributed cache of the history of the con-
trol bits along with the Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
concept, while the opcode dependent control signals are
protected by a distributed cache which can be used to flag
errors. Dynamic signals are protected by selective dupli-
cation of datapath components. The techniques are imple-
mented on the OpenRISC 1200 processor. Our simulation
results show that fault detection with single cycle recovery
is provided for 92% of all instruction executions. FPGA
synthesis is performed to analyze the associated cycle time
and area overheads.
1. Introduction
Developments in VLSI technology and numerous archi-
tectural innovations have fueled advancements in micro-
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processor design. Increasingly miniaturized systems and
higher frequencies of operations, as well as utilization in
hazardous environments, make microprocessors suscepti-
ble to faults. One of the most important factors threaten-
ing the reliability of future computer systems will be soft
errors [15]. An error can simply be defined as an unwanted
change in the logic value of a signal. Soft errors, also re-
ferred to as transient errors or single event upsets (SEUs),
are caused by transient pulses resulting from radiation strik-
ing the surface of the silicon in the processor. As scaling in
VLSI technology continues into the nanometer regime, both
memory elements and combinational gates become suscep-
tible to soft errors due to the transient pulses induced by
radiation having durations often higher than the gate prop-
agation delays. This electric pulse can propagate without
masking and may result in an error (soft error) at the appli-
cation level, hence affecting the system behavior. Further,
higher clock speeds decrease the cycle time, increasing the
probability that a soft error is latched. These trends imply
that future digital systems need to be protected against both
single event transients (SETs) and SEUs [5][12].
Various techniques at many levels of the design hierar-
chy have been developed to protect microprocessors against
failure due to faults. Fault tolerance can be achieved by us-
age of redundancy in the spatial, temporal or information
domain. Spatial redundancy is achieved by carrying out the
same computation on multiple independent functional units
at the same time. Errors are brought out on comparison of
the redundant results. A majority selection scheme can be
used to obtain a correct answer for systems implementing
triple modular redundancy (TMR) or higher redundancy un-
der certain conditions of failure. In case there are only two
redundant units available, the computation must be restarted
if the two results do not match. Spatial redundancy tech-
niques are increasingly becoming popular in the fault toler-
ance community due to higher amounts of silicon real es-
tate available to designers. Redundancy in the time domain
works by repeating the computation on the same hardware
multiple times. Information redundancy involves the stor-
age of extra bits (information) to cross check whether the
data retrieval has been free of errors. All such techniques
can be said to offer fault tolerance by either performing fault
detection coupled with recovery or providing fault masking.
There are numerous SEU tolerant architectures which
have been proposed from the research community. AR-
SMT [13] proposes using the multi threading capability of
modern processors to execute the program and a duplicate
of the program in parallel as two threads. DIVA [1] uses
spatial redundancy by providing a separate, slower pipeline
processor along side the fast processor. The Selective Series
Duplex architecture [7] consists of an integrity checking ar-
chitecture for superscalar processors that can achieve fault
tolerance capability of a duplex system at much less cost
than the traditional duplication approach. Soft error detec-
tion and recovery in the IBM Z990 is discussed in [9]. Many
such proposed techniques protect the core datapath against
faults. However, the aspect of the control logic is largely
ignored. This is due to the fact that control signals are not
easily amenable to protection using the usual fault tolerance
techniques. Schemes which provide for fault detection and
correction higher up in the design hierarchy usually have
higher penalties for recovery in comparison to fault mask-
ing and schemes implemented at a lower level. Protection
of FSM based control logic by error masking has been dis-
cussed in [3]. A signature caching scheme was proposed in
[6] to detect SEUs in the control logic of complex micropro-
cessors. The ReStore architecture [16] uses checkpointing
and rollback to recover from soft errors. The rollback is
done based on certain abnormal events such as exceptions
and incorrect control flow. This paper presents a method-
ology to obtain high coverage with relatively low hardware
overhead and performance impact with respect to control
signal faults. In addition, the presented methodology can
also be used in conjunction with other schemes protecting
the system against datapath faults, since the control and dat-
apath are considered as separately.
We classify control signals as static and dynamic de-
pending on variations in their values with the execution of
the instruction at different points of time. Static control sig-
nals are further classified as instruction dependent and op-
code dependent. We propose a scheme of three integrated
techniques to protect different types of control signals, and
to overcome the shortcomings of the present control logic
protection schemes. It operates by providing for both mask-
ing as well as detection and correction of faults.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives an overview of the proposed technique. Sec-
tions 3, 4 and 5 present the details of the the schemes to
protect three different types of control signals. Section 6
presents the implementation details and performance anal-
ysis.
2. SEU Mitigation Techniques for Micropro-
cessor Control Logic: An Overview
We tackle the task of fault tolerance by classifying con-
trol signals at the design stage on the basis of their attributes
and providing schemes for their protection. This section
deals with microprocessor control logic and their classifica-
tion for the purpose of the proposed technique followed by
a brief sketch of the component schemes.
2.1. Microprocessor Control Logic
All modern day microprocessors are based on a pipeline
structure comprised of fetch, decode, execute, memory ac-
cess and write-back stages. The control signals of a fetched
instruction are generated in the decode stage and traverse
through the pipeline along with the instruction. The pur-
pose of the proposed technique is to tackle SEUs / SETs in
the control logic segment of the datapath, as shown in Fig-
ure 1, without making any assumptions about the number of
pipeline stages.
The control signals of an instruction can be broadly clas-
sified as being either static or dynamic. Static control sig-
nals are those which remain invariant irrespective of the
state of the processor when the instruction executes. For
example, the register write signal for an instruction is not
dependent upon the processor state, but only on the instruc-
tion. Hence, it is a static control signal. Dynamic control
signals, on the other hand, are dependent upon the state of
the processor when the instruction executes. For example,
the signal indicating a taken branch could be dependent on
whether the present contents of two registers are equal.
Static control signals are further classified as being
purely dependent on the instruction itself or only on the
instruction opcode. The select control signal of the multi-
plexer at the input of the ALU is an example of the former.
The select line could choose the contents from the regis-
ter file, or from the immediate field or from the forwarding
logic. The control signal for the register file write is depen-
dent upon the opcode only. Hence, it is an example of a
static control signal dependent upon instruction type.
It would be difficult to design a single scheme to pro-
tect all the above types of control signals. Hence, a tech-
nique consisting of three integrated schemes is proposed to
provide fault tolerance for the control logic, one for each
type of control signal. The next subsection provides a brief
sketch of the components of the proposed technique.
2.2. Component Schemes of the SEU Miti-
gation Technique
A common quantitative principle used in computer ar-
chitecture is the concept of locality of reference. It refers to
Figure 1. Typical 5-stage microprocessor pipeline with the addressed vulnerabilities shown thatched
the observation that 90% of the program execution time is
spent in 10% of the code [10]. This is due to the fact that
most common workloads are heavily oriented towards loop-
ing structures. An implication is that there would be a high
probability that an instruction at a particular address would
be processed multiple times in the course of a program’s
execution. The scheme for protecting instruction dependent
static control signals works on the assumption that an SEU /
SET will not affect a particular control signal (say, the write
enable signal for the register file) in two out of three consec-
utive iterations of the same instruction. If each control bit
of a particular instruction from the previous two iterations
is stored, we would be able to maintain a history of these
signals. In other words, the control signal bit is cached in
the pipeline stage in which it is utilized. At any given point
of time from the third iteration of an instruction’s execution,
we would have three values of the signal to choose from. A
majority function can be implemented on the three values to
arrive at a TMR based decision. The technique can provide
complete fault masking from the third iteration of a loop,
and detection from the second iteration.
Static opcode dependent signals are easier to protect
since a static cache indexed by the opcode can store the dif-
ferent control signals in each pipeline stage. A comparison
of the indexed entry with the present value of the control
signal can help in detecting faults.
Dynamic signals are the most difficult to protect of the
three different control signal types. Duplication of the com-
ponent producing the dynamic control signal and compar-
ing their results would detect faults.
A high level view of the working of the component
schemes is shown in Figure 2. It traces the execution of
three sample instructions in a particular program. The in-
struction at PC value 100H, (add $r3,$r0, $r0), is executed
only once, while the instruction at PC value 160H, (addi
$r4, $r4, -1), is executed once every time the program goes
past the ‘LOOP’ label. The third instruction under consid-
eration (bf LOOP) is at PC value 180H, and modifies the PC
value to enable program execution from the ‘LOOP’ label
if the flag bit in the status register is set by the instruction at
176H.
As the program executes for the first time, the instruction
at PC value 100H is processed. The static opcode dependent
control signals are protected by fault detection and correc-
tion since the datapath already has a distributed cache of
control signal values corresponding to different opcodes. To
illustrate the working of this component scheme, let us con-
sider the register write signal in the writeback stage. In this
particular case, the opcode is that of an R-type instruction.
As soon as the instruction reaches the writeback stage, the
opcode value indexes into the writeback stage control cache
and fetches all the relevant control signals. The fetched
control signals are compared against the values propagat-
ing along with the instruction through the pipeline. Any
mismatch triggers a recovery mechanism, details of which
are presented in a later section. It must be noted that control
signals which vary from instruction to instruction can’t be
protected by this component scheme.
As the program continues executing, the instruction at
PC value 160H is processed for the first time. The static
instruction dependent control signals protection scheme be-
gins functioning, and recognizes the fact that the instruction
is being executed for the first time. Let us consider the des-
tination register number in the register writeback stage. It is
Figure 2. High level view of the component schemes of the SEU mitigation technique
utilized for the writeback, and also written into the instruc-
tion dependent control cache at the address corresponding
to the instruction’s PC value.
The program continues executing and reaches the in-
struction at PC value 180H. This instruction reads the value
of the status register, whose fields are dynamic control sig-
nals. The values are generated by the instruction at PC value
176H. Either a second copy of the status register is utilized
to decide the outcome of this instruction, or the component
utilized by the instruction at 176H is duplicated. Thus, dy-
namic control signals are handled by selective duplication
of processor components.
For the purpose of this illustration, let us assume that
the branch is taken and control shifts back to the instruc-
tion at the ‘LOOP’ label. The instruction at 160H is exe-
cuted again, and this time the logic associated with the in-
struction dependent control caching scheme recognizes that
the instruction at that particular PC value has been executed
before. The control signals are compared with the signals
from the previous iteration and a mismatch triggers a re-
covery mechanism, just as in the static opcode dependent
control signals protection scheme. This is done only for the
second execution instance, in order to improve fault cover-
age. In addition to this comparison, the control signals of
the instruction during this iteration are written into the rel-
evant cache. The previous contents, instead of being over-
written, are shifted along, in such a way that the third execu-
tion instance of the particular instruction has at its disposal
the history of control signals from the two previous itera-
tions. A TMR based decision is made possible from the
third iteration onwards with the aid of a moving window of
the history of the control signals.
It must be noted that the additional hardware involved,
such as the gates involved in the TMR based decision, are
also protected against faults due to the inherent fault mask-
ing nature of the component schemes, since they result in er-
roneous masking only when two components become faulty
at the same time. Further, the additional cache memory
instantiated is assumed to be protected by error correcting
codes (ECC). ECC is a common feature in all modern RAM
libraries, and is hence not elaborated further in this paper.
3. Opcode Dependent Control Caching
The majority of the control signals in a microprocessor
datapath fall under the static instruction dependent category.
Opcode dependent control signals form the next biggest set.
As outlined in a brief sketch in the previous section, the
protection for the opcode dependent control signals is fa-
cilitated by the addition of a distributed storage of control
signals indexed by the opcode. The term ‘distributed’ here
implies that each pipeline stage has a cache which stores
only the control signals to be processed in that particular
stage. Thus, the size of the cache in each stage will be de-
pendent on the number of control signals in that stage.
The opcode of the fetched instruction is processed to
yield the address in the opcode control cache. This ad-
dress flows through the pipeline along with the instruction.
The control signal and the contents read from the cache are
compared, and any mismatch implies a fault in the control
signal. Before the faulty control signal can be used, the
pipeline should be frozen. This freeze lasts long enough for
the transient or upset to die down. This implies a strategic
placement of the cache contents for each signal such that
the fault detection happens in the stage prior to the usage
of that particular control signal. In order to ensure that the
opcode itself is free from transient errors, it is treated as an
instruction dependent control signal and is protected by the
static instruction dependent control signal scheme outlined
in the next section.
It must be noted that this scheme is not dependent upon
the programs operating in loops. It offers protection to all
the executed instructions. On the downside, there is no fault
masking and the scheme can’t prevent penalty cycles while
recovering from faults.
4. Instruction Dependent Control Caching
A brief sketch of the static instruction dependent control
signals protection scheme has been already outlined. In this
section, we discuss the finer details of the scheme. These
include the logic associated with determining whether an
instruction under consideration is part of a loop, and if so,
determining the number of times it has been executed be-
fore. It is obvious that the history of control signals can’t be
stored for the entire program, but only for a limited number
of instructions. In other words, the cache organization for
the control cache has to be decided. Another interesting as-
pect is the design of the distributed cache structure. These
points are covered in the following subsections.
4.1 History Determination
Every cache entry in the static instruction dependent con-
trol caching scheme has a finite state machine (Figure 3)
associated with it to maintain the history details.
Figure 3. FSM for tracking the cache entry
history
On the receipt of a reset signal, all the cache entries set
themselves in the NO HISTORY state. The FSM lies dor-
mant till its corresponding address is activated by a write
in the cache entry. When a new address is input, the fact
that there is no history available is sent out in the same cy-
cle. However, as the entry registers itself, the fact that its
first iteration is underway is indicated by the update of the
entry at the writable address to ONE HISTORY. It is very
much possible that the fetch address remains in the same
state for multiple cycles, due to stalls or other reasons. For
this reason, a register holds the address output in the previ-
ous cycle. A hit which was not present in an earlier cycle
cause an update in the state provided the output address is
not the same as the previously stored address. The satura-
tion of the state machine in any of the states is prevented
by the fact that the cache entry can always be replaced by a
newly input address.
4.2 Cache Organization Determination
The control cache address and history generation mod-
ule implements the cache organization. It is placed in the
instruction fetch stage of the pipeline since the instruction
fetch address is available in this stage. The same address
can be used to index into the created module to output the
control cache address and the history status for the corre-
sponding instruction.
There are numerous options available for the cache struc-
ture. The tag and address tracking mechanism could be ei-
ther a direct mapped or a fully associative structure. Com-
monly used replacement policies in the fully associative
structure are First In First Out (FIFO) and Least Recently
Used (LRU). The direct mapped structure is chosen for its
implementation simplicity, while the fully associative struc-
ture is chosen due to the fact that all the entries provided can
be utilized.
The determination of the optimum caching type and size
is done through profiling of the workloads. The different
cache types were modeled in Simplescalar [2] and SPEC
2000 benchmarks were processed to determine the amount
of coverage provided by the cache. Simulation results and
analysis are presented in Section 6. The results indicate that
the performance of the FIFO based fully associative struc-
ture and the direct mapped structure are very close to each
other. The LRU policy in a fully associative scheme is un-
suitable for the caching requirements. While coverage for
the FIFO structure for fault detection alone is marginally
better than the direct mapped structure, the hardware re-
quirements and performance penalty for the FIFO structure
are much more. The size of the cache is directly related
to the amount of history to be kept track of, which in turn
directly affects the provided coverage.
4.3 Distributed Cache Structure
The control cache entry address and history generated
above are passed down the pipeline and utilized in each
stage. Each control signal bit to be protected has a structure
similar to the one outlined in Figure 4 placed just before the
Figure 4. A 512 entry control caching struc-
ture for a 4-bit control signal
point of utilization in its own pipeline stage. The structure
conceptually consists of two planes of memory bits orga-
nized in a fashion to facilitate flow of a particular bit from
the top to the bottom plane. This flow occurs whenever the
control signal for the instruction at that particular cache ad-
dress location is written. The protection is offered by read-
ing the two sets of bits at the particular address, combining
it with the input bits and using a majority function gate to
generate a new set of control bits. Depending on the his-
tory for that particular instruction, either the original con-
trol signal or the newly generated control bits are utilized
in the datapath. This provides the fault masking capabilities
of the scheme. The fault detection and recovery capabili-
ties of this scheme are the same as the one to be outlined in
Section 3.
5. Dynamic Control Signal Protection Scheme
Dynamic control signals are the most difficult to pro-
tect due to their inherent unpredictability. Fortunately, they
comprise the least number of control bits. The scheme
to protect these bits relies on selective duplication of the
source. Analysis of an industry standard microprocessor
for embedded applications [8] reveals that only 17% of the
control bits are dynamic in nature. These signals do not
originate from the control unit, but are produced as a result
of some operation in the datapath (such as branch or ex-
ception related signals, or signals relating to stalls) or some
external source (such as trap and system call signals).
For example, the signal indicating a taken branch might
be dependent on the value in the status register. Duplicating
this status register (or the component writing to the status
register) yields two values, which can be compared to de-
termine faults (before writing to the status register itself), if
any. Stall detection logic can again be managed with min-
imal redundancy in the form of duplication of comparators
and source signals. External signals can be made to propa-
gate on two separate lines and their integrity can be ensured
before utilization in the datapath.
At the expense of some penalty cycles, the execution can
be frozen till the concerned signals match each other. This
scheme offers protection to all the executed instructions, ir-
respective of the looping nature of the program. There is no
fault masking, and detected faults invariably lead to penalty
cycles. However, it must be kept in mind that in compari-
son with existing schemes, the number of penalty cycles for
protecting the same amount of logic is reduced by a con-
siderable amount. The exact reduction in the number of
penalty cycles can be determined by evaluating the ratio of
the number of control signal bits protected by complete fault
masking to the total number of control bits.
6. Implementation and Analysis
The proposed technique consisting of the three inte-
grated schemes has been analyzed after implementation us-
ing a two-phase approach. The first phase involved the
identification of the type and size of the control cache for
protecting the static instruction dependent control signals.
The second phase involved the implementation of the mod-
ified architecture using an industry-standard RTL processor
model. Fault coverage analysis is performed by fault in-
jection studies on the RTL model. FPGA Synthesis of the
RTL models with different fault tolerance features added is
also performed to evaluate the overheads associated with
the scheme.
6.1 Workload Profiling for Static Instruc-
tion Dependent Control Cache Design
The control cache for static instruction dependent con-
trol signals can be modeled in the Simplescalar tool set.
The designed cache structure is either fully associative or
direct mapped in nature. For a fully associative structure,
the entire program counter value must be used to tag the
cache. This enables easy identification of the cache entry
to use. Only the address of the entry needs to be passed
on to the succeeding pipeline stages, and not the program
counter value itself. The tag bits need not be duplicated in
the entries in the other pipeline stages. In a direct mapped
structure, only the bits of the PC which are not used to index
into the cache need to be stored.
These cache-like structures are modeled wherein the op-
tion of the number of entries in the cache as well as the
replacement policy to use (LRU or FIFO) can be set by the
user. The proposed technique offers protection by masking
only when a particular instruction is being executed for the
third time or higher, and the entries are still in the cache.
However, it can detect and correct a fault in the second iter-
ation itself. The developed model keeps track of the num-
ber of such instructions (the ‘hits’ in the cache) and also the
total number of requests. It is a simple task, then, to deter-
mine the percentage of instructions for which the technique
could actually afford protection, and the percentage of in-
structions which went unprotected, for different types and
sizes of the cache.
In order to evaluate the control cache size requirements,
precompiled Alpha binaries for six different integer bench-
mark programs were chosen from the SPEC2000 suite. The
Simplescalar tool set was set to execute in the Alpha ISA
mode and 1 billion instructions in each of the benchmarks
were processed, after skipping the startup section, to yield
the protection rate using the proposed scheme. It was deter-
mined that the FIFO policy is the best replacement policy.
The direct mapped structure performs consistenly well in
all the benchmarks, and provides close competition to the
FIFO structure [4]. Depending on the amount of protection
required, the number of cache entries can be decided. 512
entries for the control cache appeared to offer a good pro-
tection for all the benchmarks evaluated.
A caveat to the above analysis is that the technique pre-
sented is heavily dependent on the instruction set architec-
ture (ISA) of the machine as well as the type of workloads.
Some ISAs utilize a large number of instructions to perform
basic tasks, which could in turn lead to a large number of
instructions in each basic block. These types of programs
will require a large number of entries in the control cache
in order to ensure coverage or protection for the executed
instructions. Another point to note is that the final coverage
obtained would vary from workload to workload depending
on the program and control flow structure. Programs which
loop a large number of times are evidently offered more pro-
tection by the technique in contrast to programs with huge
linear flow of control. The next subsection deals with the
determination of the various fault tolerance metrics for the
proposed scheme.
6.2 Fault Tolerance Metrics
The fault injection model is dependent on the fault model
for which the fault tolerant hardware is designed. The con-
trol caching technique assumes a SEU model for the SER
[14]. In this case, at any particular instance of time, only
one particle hit can happen, and thus, only one particular
signal can be affected. However, the duration of the upset
can extend over multiple clock cycles. The frequency with
which these upsets occur is dependent on the environment
in which the processor is placed. The duration is dependent
on the clock frequency of the design under consideration.
A characteristic of SEUs is that they are random events and
thus may occur at unpredictable times. In this work, we
focus on the fault model called upset or transient bit-flip.
These are the easiest to check for effects in fault injection
simulations since they closely matches real faulty behavior
[11].
There are two fault tolerant architectures designed for
evaluation, one with the CAM FIFO structure for the static
instruction dependent control cache, and the other with the
direct mapped structure. Due to the simulation overhead in-
volved [4], it would be better to go ahead with a pessimistic
estimate of the fault coverage by consideration of the his-
tory state signal.
The history state output of the FIFO based CAM and
the direct mapped module is related to the address cur-
rently input. The address trace of some of the SPEC
2000 benchmarks was input to a RTL model of the cache
structure and the history state was recorded in each exe-
cution cycle. A history state of TWO HISTORY was
termed to afford complete masking, while a history state of
ONE HISTORY was termed to offer fault detection but
no masking. The simulation of the history generation RTL
model was carried out for both 512 and 1024 entries, and
the results are presented in Figure 5. It can be seen that
the direct mapped structure gives higher values for com-
plete fault masking in comparison to the CAM-based FIFO
structure for all benchmarks. An increase in the number of
entries results in more coverage as expected, since the his-
tory of more number of instructions are kept track of. If
detection and correction is considered, the trend is similar,
except that the FIFO structure has a slight edge over the di-
rect mapped structure. Some benchmarks have a significant
number of unprotected instructions due to compulsory and
capacity misses. The former is caused due to huge linear
segments of control flow, while the latter is a result of the
loop sizes exceeding the number of instructions which are
being tracked. Quantitatively, it can be inferred from the
graph that, on an average, a 512 entry direct mapped struc-
ture offers protection by complete masking and by fault de-
tection and correction to 64% and 74% of all instruction
executions respectively. The corresponding figures for a
1024 entry direct mapped structure are 69% and 82%. For
a CAM-based FIFO structure, the values for a 512 entry
cache are 52% and 79%, and for a 1024 entry cache, they
are 59% and 91% respectively. Taking into consideration
both the masking requirement as well as the fault detection
requirements, a 1024 entry direct mapped structure appears
to be a good trade-off, particularly when considering the
hardware overhead of the CAM-based FIFO structure, dis-
cussed in a later subsection.
It must be noted that the above values refer to the lowest
possible bound for the fault coverage. In practice, the gen-
erally high locality in program execution and natural mask-
ing of faults would ensure that the fault coverage would be
much higher.
Figure 5. Fault coverage in different instruc-
tion dependent control cache configurations
for various SPEC2000 benchmarks
For the opcode dependent control caching and dynamic
control signal protection schemes, there is no fault masking,
but fault detection and correction for all instruction execu-
tions. Due to the similar nature of control signals in the
Alpha as well as the OpenRISC processor (on which the
RTL implementation is performed 6.3), it is fair to assume
that the relative number of different types of control sig-
nals remains approximately the same, more so, since both
are RISC in nature. Under the above assumption, com-
plete fault masking is available for 83% of all control sig-
nals (if opcode dependent control signals are also cached
along with the instruction dependent control signals in the
instruction dependent control caching scheme) for 69% of
instruction executions on an average. Fault detection with
correction covering all the control signals can be determined
from the fact that the opcode dependent control caching and
dynamic control protection is available for 100% of all in-
struction executions for 53% of all control signals, while
the remaining 47% of the control signals are protected for
82% of all instruction executions. Denoting the percent-
age of opcode dependent and dynamic control signals by
NO and ND, and the percentage of instruction dependent
control signals by NI , the percentage of instructions for
which the opcode dependent and dynamic control signals
are protected by NIODD and the percentage of instruction
for which the instruction dependent control signals are pro-
tected by NIID, the nett fault coverage value FC can be
computed as shown in Equation 1.
FC =






Most fault tolerant architectures tend to flag an alert
signal when there is no cause for alarm. This is termed
as a ‘false positive’. In the instruction dependent control
caching scheme, there is no scope for a false positive. How-
ever, there is a possibility that the same control signal of the
same instruction can be affected in two consecutive itera-
tions of the loop. In this case, the first iteration would be
protected by the earlier stored signals. However, the next
set of iterations would suffer till the erroneous signal gets
overwritten in the history. However, keeping in mind the
probability of SEUs, this situation is very unlikely. Another
related metric of interest is fault sensitivity. The proposed
technique does not interfere with the fault sensitivity of any
of the nodes. However, if it is determined that some of the
nodes have a higher fault sensitivity, then, the technique can
be applied to those nodes with a higher priority.
6.3 Control Caching Implementation in
the OpenRISC 1200
The control caching technique is implemented on the
RTL model of a microprocessor in order to evaluate both
effectiveness and performance. We consider a specific im-
plementation of the OpenRISC 1000 family of processors,
namely, the OpenRISC 1200 processor [8], and modify it to
implement the proposed fault tolerance technique.
The OpenRISC 1200 is a 32-bit scalar, 5–stage integer
pipeline RISC processor with Harvard microarchitecture.
The control signals of the architecture were analyzed and
it was determined that there were 53 control bits in total
spread over 22 distinct control signals. Out of these, 44
are static in nature, while 9 are dynamic. Out of the 44
static signals, 25 of them are instruction dependent, while
19 are opcode dependent. Thus, for the considered proces-
sor, 47% of the control bits are protected by the static in-
struction dependent control caching scheme, while 33% are
protected by the static opcode dependent caching scheme.
The remaining 17% of the signals are protected by the dy-
namic control protection scheme. The proposed schemes
were implemented on the RTL model and verified for func-
tional correctness. FPGA synthesis was performed and the
overheads analyzed. The details are presented in the follow-
ing subsections.
6.4 Memory Overhead
The designed technique involves overheads in the form
of extra storage required for the cache. These memory bits
consume some power and can have an impact on the critical
path of the design also. This subsection presents a detailed
analysis of these metrics.
Considering the instruction dependent control cache first
and denoting the number of control bits to be protected in
all the pipeline stages put together by N and the number
of control cache entries by K, we can determine the extra
amount of storage required as follows. The storage essen-
tially is divided into three segments, the major contribution
coming from the cache itself. The other components of the
overhead are the storage requirements for the tag bits and
the history bits.
The fact that a TMR structure is used for the control
cache indicates that the number of memory elements in all
the pipeline stages required for the control cache, MCC is
given by Equation 2, while the requirements for the history
storage, MHS is given by Equation 3.
MCC = 2KN (2)
MHS = 2K (3)
The number of memory elements required for the storage
of the tag bits in the direct mapped structure, MTBDM is
given by Equation 4, while the number of memory elements
required for the storage of the tag bits in the FIFO structure,
MTBF IF O is given by Equation 5.
MTBDM = K(30 − log2K) (4)
MTBF IF O = 30K (5)
Considering the opcode dependent control caching next
and denoting the number of opcode dependent control sig-
nals by No and the number of distinct opcodes to index into
the cache by Ko, the memory overhead without the ECC,
MOCC is given by Equation 6.
MOCC = KoNo (6)
The complete memory overhead, MODM for the direct
mapped structure is given by Equation 7 and is the sum of
the individual overheads
MODM = MCC + MHS + MTBDM + MOCC
= K(2(N + 1) + 30 − log2K) + KoNo (7)
The complete memory overhead for the FIFO structure,
MOF IF O is given by Equation 8 and is the sum of the in-
dividual overheads.
MOF IF O = MCC + MHS + MTBF IF O + MOCC
= K(2(N + 1) + 30) + KoNo (8)
Analysis of the OpenRISC 1200 reveals that there are
53 distinct opcode combinations. Using Equation 7, it can
be determined that a 512 entry direct mapped structure for
control caching in the OpenRISC 1200 would require 37.5
kbits, while a 1024 entry cache based on the same configu-
ration would take up 73 kbits. On the other hand, for a CAM
based FIFO, Equation 8 suggests that a 512 entry struc-
ture would require 42 kbits of memory, while 1024 entries
would require 83 kbits. In comparison to the huge sizes of
modern processor caches, the area contributed by less than
a hundred kilobits will not be significant.
6.5 Operating Frequency Overhead
The additional operations in the proposed scheme mostly
take place in parallel with the already existing operations of
the datapath. Analysis of the RTL implementation revealed
that the addition of the history and tag tracking mechanism
in the fetch stage had a penalty on the operating frequency.
To counter this, it was decided to internally pipeline the
fetch stage such that every instruction spends two cycles
in it. The tag tracking and update were designed to be ex-
ecuted in two cycles. This affects the latency, but not the
processor throughput.
In the case of instruction dependent control caching
scheme and opcode dependent control caching scheme, the
following delays are added to the path, if the protected con-
trol signals are needed in the beginning of a pipeline stage
to proceed with the operations. Initially, the control cache
needs to be accessed and the stored history read. The time
for this is denoted by tCCA. This data is input to the ma-
jority function module, which has at most two gate delays
denoted by tMF . There is a multiplexing delay of tMux
involved in determining whether the output of the majority
function module or the original signal itself is to be utilized.
Thus, a possible overhead of tCCO given by Equation 9 is
added to the critical path timing.
tCCO = tCCA + tMF + tMux (9)
In most processors, these delays are not as significant as
the delays involved in the rest of the operations performed
in the pipeline stages. In the case that these delays severely
hamper the operating frequency of the design, the control
cache segment of each signal can be moved to the stage
prior to the pipeline stage in which it is being utilized. Thus,
the delays involved would be masked by the operations in
the previous stage. However, the control signal is exposed
to SEUs at the pipeline register storing the protected value.
6.6 FPGA Synthesis Results
Three different RTL models were subjected to synthesis
on a Xilinx Virtex FPGA using the Xilinx ISE 7.1 synthesis
tool. Table 1 summarizes the results.
The slice utilization goes up by 19% for the CAM based
FIFO model and by 16% for the direct mapped model in
comparison to the non-fault tolerant version of the proces-
sor. The flip-flop usage goes up by 10% for the CAM
while it is only 3% more for the direct mapped structure.
The penalty in operating frequency is just 6% in the direct
mapped case, while it is as much as 21% in the CAM based
FIFO case. It is due to the fact that the implementation of
large sized CAMs in FPGAs are not efficient. High per-
formance CAMs are possible in ASIC implementation. It
appears that inspite of theoretically being superior, CAM
Table 1. FPGA Synthesis Results for OpenRISC 1200
RTL Model (Fault tolerance hardware) Equivalent Gate Count Operating frequency
OR1200 (No fault tolerance) 1,140,805 83.15 MHz
OR1200 (1024 entry CAM based FIFO) 1,610,570 66.02 MHz
OR1200 (1024 entry direct mapped) 1,544,827 78.07 MHz
based FIFO replaced control caches are not suitable for
practical implementations in comparison to direct mapped
structures.
7. Conclusions
A technique to protect the control signals of the datap-
ath of a microprocessor has been proposed. It comprises of
three integrated schemes, two of which involve the place-
ment of a distributed cache to store the control signals of
the instructions. A direct mapped structure for the instruc-
tion dependent control signals cache has been found to be
most effective taking both the coverage and resource uti-
lization into consideration. Fault coverage metrics for both
512 and 1024 cache entries have been determined, and the
technique has been shown to protect 92% of all instruction
executions with minimal area and cycle time overheads. A
host of advantages are offered by the proposed technique in
comparison with the previous related work [4]. The imple-
mentation of the technique is simple and there is a lesser
overall overhead since penalty cycles are avoided due to
the absence of the need for instruction re-execution in most
cases. Recovery in case of detected faults also involves min-
imal cycles. The components of the scheme are also self-
correcting. Possible future extensions to the work include
the implementation of the above technique on multi-issue
superscalar processors. Fabricating a processor along with
the fault tolerance and detection mechanisms for the con-
trol logic and subjecting it to irradiation could validate the
analysis presented here and provide practical proof of the
efficiency of the proposed approach.
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